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USSR Report

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USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MSU KURKOTKIN INTERVIEWED ON TROOPS' DAILY LIFE

PM271555 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Nov 85 Second Edition p 2

["Topical Interview" with Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Kurko Lin, USSR deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services, by Colonel Yu. Teplov: "The Troops' Daily Life and Combat Readiness"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] An All-Army Conference on Improving the Daily Life of Troops begins in Moscow 28 November. On the threshold of the conference, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Kurkotkin, USSR deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services, answered a number of questions at the request of Colonel Yu. Teplov, editor of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's culture and daily life department.

[Teplov] Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, it is 8 years since the last All-Army Conference. What changes have taken place during that period in the daily life of the Armed Forces?

[Kurkotkin] First, let us define what we mean by the troops' daily life [byt] today. Looking at it superficially, it is only a sphere of domestic activity. But if we look into it more deeply, daily life is more a political concept. Remember what Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze said about the red barracks. It must be not only a place of military training for the Red Army man, but also a place of education—both political and cultural—so that he does not feel the burden of being away from his home atmosphere, so that he studies and, when he returns home, is properly prepared for the fulfillment of his general civic duties... Improving daily life means putting into practice the party's social policy, its line of steadily increasing the working people's well-being and improving their working and living conditions. This line was confirmed yet again in the precongress documents which have been submitted for broad discussion by the people.

Now for the changes which have taken place since the last All-Army Conference. These have been determined by the development of the country's economy and its scientific and technical progress. First, there has been a renewal of our garrisons and military camps in the light of modern architectural solutions. We have reached the point of placing on the agenda the question of their full autonomy and the maximum satisfaction of the servicemen's multifaceted needs, from trade and domestic needs to spiritual needs. Many garrisons have seen

a considerable reduction in the time taken to provide servicemen's families with apartments, and moreover the apartments are built to better designs. Facts and figures could be cited to characterize the improvement in the quality of medical services, food and clothing supplies, and the organization of servicemen's leisure. Such measures have been taken, they are well known, and more will be taken in future. But today the imperative of the time is that attention must be focused on unresolved problems and the quest for ways of further improving any sphere of activity. It is for this purpose that we are convening the next All-Army Conference on Improving the Daily Life of Troops.

[Teplov] The results of the all-army review competition for the best garrison in terms of material and daily life conditions have been summed up. How would you characterize them?

[Kurkotkin] First, the review competition, as one avenue of socialist competition in the Army and Navy, showed that it is within our power to do a great deal. Everything depends on the skill, initiative, and will of commanders, political workers, and officers of the rear services. We even came up against the fact that there turned out to be more garrisons with a real claim to first, second, and third class diplomas than there were prize places. The review competition revealed a particular law: The military units and ships which have the best amenities also look better in terms of the year's results for combat training and military discipline. Take, for instance, the military unit commanded by Colonel N. Yatsenko. In the garrison where it is billetted there is nothing in excess, but the official and residential buildings are kept in exemplary condition and the territory is clean and in good order. Regulation order, let me stress. And the personnel observe that order through duty and conscience--that is how the people have been educated. It is no accident that there are no gross violations of military discipline here and, as the end-ofyear check showed, the unit's combat readiness is at a high level. We awarded this garrison a first class diploma.

But the review competition also revealed a number of problems. In some districts, groups of forces, and fleets too much attention was devoted to those garrisons which were represented in the review competition. This attention was to the detriment of others, where there are still many shortcomings of various kinds. And the task is to bring all garrisons and military camps up to the standard of the best. Unfortunately it is not always possible to build a new barracks. We will have to put up with this for the time being. But there must be regulation order in every barracks, and everything provided for in the regulations must exist there.

One more conclusion. Although rear workers are directly responsible for daily life, without due attention to these questions on the part of commanding officers, military councils, commanders at all levels, and political organizers great successes cannot be achieved. On the credit side, we can single out the Carpathian Military District. This is largely because the problems of the provision of daily amenities have been the concern of Army General V. Belikov, commander of the district, the military council, and the political directorate. It is no accident that the provision of housing for servicemen's families is far better here than in other regions.

At the same time we have many complaints against the Pacific Fleet, the Turkestan Military District, and certain others. Here certain commanders, claiming to be busy with questions of combat training, have devoted very little attention to people's daily life, forgetting that in army life everything is interconnected. How a soldier or seamen is fed, clothed, and shod and his state of health determine how he shoots, drives his combat vehicle, or follows a target on the radar screen. The mood in which the officer, ensign, or warranted officer approaches his service determines how he commands people and executes his official duties. Failing to show concern for people's daily life is at best a wasteful, uneconomical attitude in terms of the quality of their military labor. Concern for daily life is concern for combat readiness and the ability to act in a real combat situation.

[Teplov] Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, during the Great Patriotic War years you commanded a tank brigade. Apparently even then you had to concern yourself with questions of daily life?

[Kurkotkin] "Had to" is putting it mildly. In the report to the superior commander about readiness for a combat operation and the availability of men, hardware, and shells, it was stressed without fail: "The personnel have been given a hot meal." This form of report placed great responsibilities on the commanders... Any interval between fighting, if, of course, the opportunity arose, was used to give people a bath. Not for nothing did the poet Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, who himself trod the roads of war for many leagues, devote these splendid lines to the bathhouse: "In a life of peace or fighting, on any front line, our body and soul welcome the caress of the bath..." This is only a poem, but has a point, namely to exclude cases where, in field conditions, because of poor organization on the part of commanders and inefficiency on the part of rear officers and the warrant officers of subunits, people go without a bath or a hot meal.

Daily life in the field has its own special features arising from the conditions approximating to those which will operate in real combat. Here paradoxes are sometimes encountered. On the one hand certain officers who find themselves in autonomous conditions in resolving independent tasks are unable to organize the most basic thing, like a change of uniform or the drying of boots. On the other hand—and we came across this in several districts—at firing ranges or training centers they have built fashionable buildings for the officers of the staff and the directorates, with foyers, carpeted paths, soft furniture, and other conveniences. This is not daily life in the field, it is luxury. Nothing like that will be available in combat conditions. The field is the field, and it demands a campaigning, tent style of life. That is a reserve for the rational utilization of material resources. If they are saved, they can be released to improve daily life in winter quarters.

[Teplov] Probably reserves for savings and thrift can be found in the most diverse spheres of the military collective's life?

[Kurkotkin] There is a term "regimental economics." Translated into ordinary language, it means the art of managing regimental affairs. Savings depend on how this is done. I do not think there is any need to enumerate all the spheres

which go to make up the complex regimental economy. A specific person, a specific organizer, is responsible for each of them, from the subunit warrant officer (let me observe that a good warrant officer makes things easier for the commander) to the chiefs of services. And the entire economy is directed by the commander, who cannot be conceived of today without a knowledge of the basics of economic work.

Considerable experience in saving material resources has been accumulated in the Armed Forces. In the rear services alone the annual savings totals millions of rubles. Every year the troops save thousands of tons of fuel and grain, and the total quantity of meat handed over to provide the planned supplies to troops from subsidiary farms is 25,000-30,000 metric tons. Among the troops there are many examples of whole subunits which win the title of thrifty, making whatever contribution is in their power to the fulfillment of the Communist Party's demand for the economy to be economical.

[Teplov] Last winter brought many surprises for our garrisons. Some camps found themselves without heating. In your opinion, how have preparations for this winter gone?

[Kurkotkin] Yes, there were some surprises. And they were unexpected to those who were leaving things to chance. The reason was irresponsibility, inefficiency, and I would even say muddleheadedness on the part of certain officials, who did not go unpunished. This year the situation is better, and many people have learned the lessons of last year. But it is too soon to call a halt, work must continue in this direction.

[Teplov] The editorial office often receives letters in which readers report shortcomings in sanatorium and resort provision. What measures are being taken to put this matter to rights?

[Kurkotkin] I know KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has raised this question. One article in the newspaper prompted a comprehensive check on military sanatoriums and leisure houses. I recently signed an order on the basis of its results. It provides for measures to set to rights the leisure and treatment of servicemen and their families. I think the problem of overloading of military sanatoriums will be resolved.

[Teplov] Which could be classified as the key problems in terms of improving the troops' daily life. Any omission immediately affects people's mood, and ultimately the interests of the cause suffer. All the same, I think some key aspects can be highlighted.

The housing question remains acute. The main efforts should be directed toward remote garrisons, where military organizations do the construction work. Unfortunately shortcomings in the troops' daily life are sometimes built in at the planning stage. What does it mean if when a military camp is built there is no plan for a bath and laundry combine or some other domestic facility?...

The service sphere requires improving as regards military trade, especially where there are no state stores, workshops, or consumer combines... For all

the brilliant achievements of military medicine as a science, there are short-comings in the practice of medical services for the troops... Subsidiary farms should also be further developed, with a view to having them in every unit and every financially autonomous enterprise of the USSR Defense Ministry.

The times demand a more critical approach to the evaluation of our affairs. But even today, in resolving the questions of organizing daily life, we must look not only to tomorrow, but much further ahead. At times it may seem that a certain limit of perfection has already been achieved, and then we become complacent. That feeling not only "lulls" certain unfortunate organizers of various ranks, but also robs them of the ability to make a sober assessment of the changes taking place.

Therefore the purposes of the All-Army Conference is to promote keener attention to unresolved questions and to discuss comprehensively those aspects of the troops' life which cause concern and prevent the defender of the motherland from fulfilling his sacred duty to full pitch. The further improvement of the servicemen's material and living conditions, the strengthening of their health, and the improvement of the cultural level always have a positive effect on the life of the unit or ship, markedly promote successes by servicemen in combat training and service, and act as a stimulus to high combat readiness.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

EDITORIAL ON DISCIPLINE

PM211415 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Nov 85 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "The Communist and the Consolidation of Discipline"]

[Text] Order and discipline are one of the most important conditions for the successful solution of tasks connected with accelerating Soviet society's socio-economic development. In strengthening discipline and order in everything, the CPSU Central Committee October (1985) Plenum noted, while making active use of moral and material incentives and revealing the increasingly broad scope for the masses' initiative and creativity, it is also important to continue to build up the pace of our headway.

This proposition is also of fundamental importance for the activity of the Army and Navy party organizations, every Communist, and all military cadres. Resolving to a modern standard the tasks connected with intensifying the training process and enhancing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces is inconceivable without the highest degree of organization and discipline.

And it is perfectly natural that the question of the further consolidation of military discipline today faces the commanders with sole authority. It is also being raised particularly acutely in the party organizations. That is also how it sounded at the report and election meeting held at a missile division party organization. Major M. Druzhinin was given the floor. The Communists know him as a leading officer, honest and principled and not used to tolerating shortcomings. This time too Druzhinin started to talk of defects in work to strengthen discipline and named the Communists whose contribution to the solution of this problem is still only modest and those who are not themselves distinguished by punctiliousness and organization and who have failed to assess their own work self-critically. This concern was also to be felt in the other speeches, although the division as a whole is rated a good one. The main thing which the Communists took away with them from the meeting was an inclination for specific work from which no one must stand aloof and understanding of its comprehensive nature, and a feeling of implacability toward any deviations from martial order.

Unfortunately, this approach is not displayed everywhere. Often words about the need to strengthen discipline are not backed up by real deeds and the steps taken lack consistency and system. After all, the following still happens. In a subunit it looks as though everyone is fighting for the consolidation of discipline and making erring soldier strictly answerable, yet at the same time they tolerate violations of the order of the day and the personnel's removal from studies. This inconsistently is confusing and damps the personnel's ardor. Formalism in work, when instead of specific organizational efforts aimed at strengthening discipline of a particular political organ, staff, or party committee, merely records the number of misdemeanors and sanctions imposed also harms the cause. Some leaders are concerned not so much for the improvement of matters as for favorable indicators on paper and the ability to make a report which smooths out sharp corners. All this, of course, cannot be tolerated.

The times demand that Communists and all military cadres resolutely restructure their thinking and change their attitude toward work to strengthen discipline and military order. Here the Communist's stance as an active party fighter must be displayed particularly prominently. In struggling to strengthen discipline he acts with conviction and seeks to raise the servicemen's consciousness. He is not indifferent to the way servicemen treat study and to how they behave in service and in daily life. Everything concerns him, everything is his business. This stance prompts him to go to people. To go with a clear aim and specific mission. Yet an officer and a Communist arriving in a company may isolate himself in his office, spending his time away from the soldiers and sergeants. This visit is of little benefit to the subunit. Being with the personnel and working with them means above all being close to people, discussing urgent questions with them, working with the Komsomol aktiv, teaching sergeants and petty officers, and involving soldiers and sailors with higher education in educational work. It means knowing how the military collective lives, helping its cohesion and the assertion in it of principles of mutual relations between servicemen like collectivism, martial comradeship, friendship, and mutual understanding, and resolutely opposing any manifestations of nonstatury relationships. Qualities of the party fighter like his political maturity, responsibility, and a creative approach toward matters can be revealed in full here in work with people.

The Communist's struggle to strengthen discipline begins with himself. Wherever a party member may serve—in a subunit or staff, institution or enterprise—his duty, as the draft of the CPSU Statutes with the proposed amendments emphasizes, is to set an example of a high degree of organization and discipline, to observe the norms of Communist morality, and to display modesty and probity. His own probity gives him the moral right to lead people and to adopt a principled stance in the struggle against shortcomings. The Communist's good, unsullied name is a reliable moral bulwark in his struggle for discipline.

This bulwark is particularly necessary to the leader—the commander, political worker, or staff officer. People expect considerably more from him than they do from an ordinary Communist. Not one of his blunders, however small, and all the more so any deviation from party ethics and Communist morality remains unnoticed. A profound degree of competence, principledness and exactingness, and a knowledge of Soviet laws, the oath, and the military statutes and the fulfillment of their requirements and qualities without which there is no real leader. Unostentatious modesty, kindliness toward his subordinates, simplicity and accessibility, and spiritual sensitivity are no less important for him.

It is not for rhetoric's sake that all this has to be said. Unfortunately, there are still manifestations of rudeness and tactlessness. Individual party members have to be made answerable for window-dressing, write-ups, the abuse of their official position, and drunkenness. It is clear what negative moral consequences that entails. Such instances are manifested primarily where lack of control and unprincipledness make themselves felt. Is this not borne out by the story of officer and Communist G. Bedunkevich, which was in fact told recently in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. He was rude and arrogant in dealing with his sub-ordinates and abused his official position. Yet his immediate boss described him as disciplined, demanding, and honest. He was given a party reprimand but they immediately hastened to repeal it because the time had come to submit the officer for his next military title. There was a proper outcome to this unseemly story. Lieutenant Colonel Bedunkevich was expelled from the CPSU and dismissed from his post.

Shortcomings in discipline and manifestations of lack of organization are always a specific person's omissions or lack of responsibility. That is why the sanction must be specific too. In every party organization an atmosphere must be created such that the culprits are mentioned personally without fear of offending someone or spoiling relations. To this end more active use must be made of Communists' reports at party meetings and party committee and party bureau sessions.

Increasing each Communist's contribution to the struggle to strengthen discipline and military order means promoting a high pitch of combat training, the assertion of a healthy moral atmosphere in the military collectives, and the maintenance of the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces at a high level.

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WARSAW PACT

BRIEFS

NEW GDR DEFENSE MINISTER--Berlin December 3 TASS--By a decision of the GDR State Council, Heinz Kessler has been appointed minister of national defense of the GDR. He was promoted to the ranks of army general, the ADN news agency reports. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1523 GMT 3 Dec 85 LD]/12766

CSO: 1812/43

ARMED FORCES

ARMY GENERAL YAZOV ON ISOLATION OF COMMANDERS FROM PERSONNEL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Arm Gen D. Yazov, commander of the troops of the Red Banner Far East Military District: "Time and Style of Work: Closeness to the People"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Plenum that took place on October 15 will go down as a shining landmark in the life of our party and of all the Soviet people. Documents of enormous political importance were discussed at it. Their subject was our program aims and central questions of the general party line, its economic strategy and its forms and methods of work among the masses in a modern, exceedingly complex and crucial period of history.

The party again pointed out the necessity of improving the style of personnel work and, in particular, aiming it at the development of the initiative and creativity of the masses through the utmost activization of work among them and the strengthening of closeness to the people as one of the requisite conditions of solving the problems advanced and realizing the projected plans of accelerating the socio-economic development of our society.

Specific tasks flow from the party directives for military personnel as well. The words of Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his speech before a meeting of Leningrad party organization activists are addressed to every communist-leader, including military ones: "Closer to the people and greater trust in them." Putting this requirement into practice is indissolubly associated with the decision of the task advanced by the April and October (1985) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee to activate the human factor and to achieve a situation where each works in his place conscientiously and with full return.

If you were to ask me today which period of service illuminated most strongly for me the role and significance of the unity of the commander with his sub-ordinates I would, of course, name its beginning as the terrible unforgettable years of the Great Patriotic War.

... The Winter of 1942. Along with other lieutenants, I am assigned to the Volkhov Front after completing the accelerated course at the military institute. Only a total of a few hundred meters separates our defense line from the forward edge of the Hitlerites. The enemy has found the range of every

meter of our trenches. But, in spite of the difficulty, it was necessary to undertake combat preparation of the platoon and the education of the people. It is easy to say "education" now, but practice placed before me then many complicated questions. The first was how to gain authority over these people, many of whom were more than twice as old as I was and had undergone a baptism of fire. Frankly speaking, at first I felt a chill of mistrust and alienation on the part of the subordinates. Much could be said about how it was overcome. But the main thing, perhaps, was that I spared no effort in preparing them for the impending offensive battles and tried to find an approach to each. There were, for example, semi-literate soldiers in the platoon. I wrote letters home for them and read the responses. All of this did not pass without notice. I felt that the contacts with subordinates and the cohesion of the platoon were strengthening, and it was demonstrated especially graphically in the first attack where we successfully fulfilled our combat mission.

Other officers operated in a similar fashion. A comrade of mine from the institute, Kostya Solov'yev, has always remained for me an example in this regard. His subordinates loved him for his exacting attitude, his concern for them, his sincere openness and his accessibility. He knew how to approach a person and how to create an atmosphere of mutual responsibility and trust in a collective. His platoon was distinguished by strong cohesion and reliability in combat.

There was something to learn from our regimental commander of the concluding stage of the war, Lt Col I. Shapshayev, later named a Hero of the Soviet Union. He had an attitude of genuinely paternal affection for his soldiers.

I am confident that every front-line soldier could name a multitude of similar examples. We find many instructive instances in the memoirs of our renowned military leaders, who placed closeness to the personnel and concern for the soldier in the forefront. The lessons of the front have lasting significance for us today as well.

A closeness to the people, grounded in class unity, is a feature of the party and a facet of the Leninist style of work. An invaluable maxim, that acquires an especial topicality in our times, is the idea of V. I. Lenin on the necessity of living in the thick of the masses, listening to them, perceiving their moods and reflecting their aspirations in practical policies.

Life proves again and again that closeness to the people is the most important indication of the party and professional maturity of a commander, political worker or staff officer and is a requisite condition for effective work on improving combat readiness and strengthening discipline. After all, in the end result combat readiness depends not only on the power and condition of weapons, but also to a great extent on whether the people are fed in a timely fashion, have shoes and clothes and are provided with everything necessary, and on their mood.

... The first combat firing was coming up in the motorized rifle training platoon. They decided to hold a Komsomol meeting the night before. According to

general opinion it turned out to be energetic and mobilizing. This was made possible to a great extent by the speech of Lt Col N. Budnik. He recalled his first firing, his agitation before it, gave some practical advice and tried to instill confidence in success. The next day, Lt Col Budnik came to the training school before the start of the firing. He went out among the first to the firing line with an automatic weapon and carried out the exercise with an excellent rating. During a break he turned up in a tight circle of soldiers. He was interested in what news the soldiers received from home, enquired whether they were forgetting to write home themselves and had a good word for those who had performed outstandingly. He shared his impression of the meeting and the firing at an officers' meeting and a session of the party committee.

This is not a random episode for Lt Col Budnik, who considers his work with the youth and the Komsomol as his party and service duty and a most important channel for strengthening contact with the body of soldiers. It greatly typifies his work style, which is based on a deep knowledge of his business and a striving to study the life of the personnel and such cells of the regimental organism as detachments, platoons and companies by way of a lively intercourse with the people.

There are many such examples in our district. Maj Gen V. Ustinov, the chief of the okrug engineer troops, and officers N. Palukha, I. Yefanov, N. Gudkov, G. Soldatov, A. Eflakov and many others have shown themselves to be skillful organizers and teachers for whom sincere contact with subordinates and an exacting attitude and respect toward them have become an everyday norm and requirement.

Common to them is a knowledge of how to rely on party and Komsomol organizations in all their activities and a striving to solve problems of improving combat readiness and strengthening discipline, first and foremost through reinforcing work with the people and activating the human factor.

Along with this, it is impossible not to acknowledge that the problem exists of the isolation of some commanders and officers from their personnel and a weak knowledge by them of the true state of affairs. Typical in this regard is this example. In the company commanded by Capt V. Voshchevoz a flagrant breach of military discipline was committed. Officers V. Ovsyannikov and Yu. Komogorov were inclined to classify it as a random occurrence. Analysis showed, however, that the breach had been brewing for a long time. It had fed on the atmosphere of a weak exacting attitude in the company, the non-observance of the agenda and permissiveness with regard to so-called petty violations. The fact that the incident occurred, in the words of Ovsyannikov and Komogorov, totally unexpectedly for them, not only does not vindicate officer-communists, but deepens their guilt. Can a poor knowledge of the situation in the entrusted section and of the true atmosphere in the collective really serve as justification for a leader?

The cited company was located, as they say, a stone's throw from the headquarters and the unit's political section. Various responsible officers had been here frequently. But a visit per se to the barracks, as is well known, does not produce much. Closeness to the people is not determined by the number of hours spent with them, but by actual influence on them and the ability to listen to the soldier and understand him.

A genuine closeness has deep ideological and spiritual roots. It also needs to be emphasized that closeness to the people is a specific conception filled with not only a spiritual, but a material substance presupposing everyday organizational work. From a formal point of view, it is difficult to accuse, for example, Officer A. Lopata of being out of touch with his personnel. He frequently visited the officers' dormitory and spoke with its residents. But what changed after that? It remains just as cold and bleak in the dormitory rooms as it was a year or two ago. The matter has advanced no further than empty conversations. Serious reprimand is also called forth by the conditions in the barracks in the unit area.

Isolation from the personnel and a poor knowledge of the situation is in decisive measure explained by the low work effectiveness of Maj V. Andyamov, the former regimental commander, who was unable to maintain a high level of discipline in the unit. He has been demoted. We will be demanding in the future as well of those who do not want to reorganize their work methods and learn to work among the masses.

I cannot forget the following instance. In one of the units I had occasion to meet a soldier with a striking chronic boil on his cheek. It turned out that he had gone around for about a week with such a "marking." The soldier had not resorted to the physician even though, as he admitted, the pain was considerable. Just where, it is asked, were the detachment commander, company sergeant-major and platoon commander, who are obligated to take steps to render medical assistance to the men? "Didn't notice, didn't give it any significance."

Didn't "notice" that a subordinate was suffering pain in the literal sence of the word. What does this say about the ability to detect some person's feelings, mental pain...

To be close to subordinates in no way means to play up to them. People do not really like such leaders. They respect leaders who are strict, organized, demanding and thoughtful. At the same time, a demanding attitude must not be confused with fault-finding and harassing people. Unfortunately, certain officers have forgotten how to speak normal human language in the servive, erroneously supposing that bellowing and bad language can move matters along. How can we speak of sincere contact here? It is difficult to gauge the moral casualties that are inflicted by the abuse of service status, the manifestation of individualism and egoism, bureaucratic isolation on the part of certain leaders and a tolerance by other commanders of ostentatiousness and glorification, servility and toadying and to extant instances of discrepancy between word and deed in the struggle against drunkenness.

Attention needs to be devoted once again to regulation requirements for the all-round study of personnel by way of contact with them not only in the service, but in day-to-day life. An experienced educator will always find the

opportunity to visit the officers' dormitory and the young family's apartment, to meet with the activists of the women's council, to investigate questions of organizing the leisure time of soldiers and officers' educating the children.

We consider raising the effectiveness of the organizational and political work of key personnel and strengthening their closeness to the people as a most important constituent part of all work in fulfilling the decisions of the April and October (1985) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and preparing for the 27th Party Congress.

Great attention is devoted to this at party reporting and electoral meetings. The meeting I was able to attend the other day, for example, was instructive. The idea of the necessity of strengthening individual work and concern for people was a common thread that ran through the report of Capt A. Kapustin, the secretary of a missile battery party organization, and the speeches of communists.

Analysis also shows that in some units the danger exists of reducing the work in this sector to a routine campaign. The necessity of strengthening work among the personnel and reaching every individual is much spoken of in meetings and conferences at the large formation and unit level. But sometimes the echo of these conversations, so to speak, is not audible in the platoons and companies.

We see our task as giving all of this work a systematic character, placing it on a solid practical basis and carrying over the main efforts to the detachments, platoons, companies and equivalent subunits. Measures are projected to increase the role of sergeants and to improve officer training, especially of the young ones, and individual work practices. Communist-leaders, drawing on their experience at the front, are summoned to teach key personnel to be able to work with people first and foremost by personal example and by way of everyday individual influence. Unfortunately, it happens sometimes that a senior officer arrives in a unit, lectures the commander on shortcomings discovered, reprimands him and departs. At a recent session of the district military council, where questions of unit commander formation were being reviewed, the following example was cited: a certain regimental commander had received more than ten reprimands over the year. A thoughtful individual approach with regard to him, an attempt not only to require but to teach him was clearly insufficient for some officers. But after all, the regimental commander has a decisive role in the unity of the collective and the creation of a healthy moral atmosphere. It is precisely working with this category of commander that we are stressing in solving problems of improving the work style of key personnel.

All the personnel of the district today live with one aspiration—to complete successfully the training year, to fulfill completely their duties in competition and to worthily meet the 27th CPSU Congress. Every day the officers, heirs of the front—line troops, lead their subordinates into the attack on

the fields of combat training. Figuratively speaking, the attack never ends. Even now, if we take into account the scope and complexity of the tasks, each of us especially needs the characteristic attack mentality of total readiness to achieve the projected goals, maximum self-discipline, orderliness and a striving forward. And so essential are unity with subordinates and the art of being able to approach each and to lead them.

12821

ARMED FORCES

YOUTH PREPARATION FOR MILITARY SERVICE CRITICIZED

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri 24 September 1985 carries on page 3 a 500-word Azerinform report on the regular meeting of the Council for Civil Defense and Military Patriotic Education of the CC AzCP. General-Major A.A. Gasymov, military commissar of the republic, pointed out that "much work has to be done in improving the basic military preparation of youth and raising the level of Russian language instruction, especially in rural areas. Preventive work with draft-age youth is poorly conducted, and medical examinations in some cities and rayons are conducted superficially." Other speakers noted that in the process of accepting youth into the military academies, "one must eliminate the formal relationship of rayon military commissariats to this important work."

POOR RUSSIAN KNOWLEDGE AMONG DRAFTEES

[Editorial Report] Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri 18 September 1985 carries on page 3 a 1600-word article by Afat Gurbanov, rector of the Azerbaijan Pedagogical Institute, on problems connected to youths' entrance into higher schools and preparation for military service. Noting many shortcomings in students' knowledge of physical sciences, mathematics and the Azerbaijani language, he added that "at this point I have to mention another important question. As in the rest of the republic, here introductory military education and physical education are one and the same faculty. In this faculty lectures are given in Russian and its graduates certified by the rayon military commissariats. But practise shows that the great majority of those submitting documents to the faculty have a poor knowledge of Russian. There is one basic way to eliminate this shortcoming: the military must either give serious thought to the youths' perfect knowledge of Russian when selecting cadres, or they will have to organize a Russian language course in the rayons and train them."

/7358

CSO: 1831/408

ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

USSR MINISTER RETURNS FROM GDR--Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, returned to Moscow from the GDR today. He took part in the latest session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1930 GMT 7 Dec 85 ID] /8918

GROUND FORCES

TANK UNIT FAILS IN MOUNTAIN MARCH--POOR UNIT PREPARATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen M. Sotskov: "Field Training of Troops: On Mountain Routes"]

[Text] The tank battalion under the command of Maj V. Bikchentayev had to execute a march over unfamiliar terrain and, forestalling the "enemy" from capturing a favorable line, prevent the approach of his reserves. The tankers had to operate within a strict time limit. At the same time, the battalion's advance route was laid out along mountain roads that abounded with sharp turns and ascents and descents of varying steepness. Scree and deep canyons were constantly encountered along the way. In short, the tankers had to overcome all of the difficulties that inevitably arise before those who execute a march in the mountains.

Try as he might, the battalion commander was unable to stay within the allotted time--with every kilometer the speed of travel fell and the distance between vehicles increased. The battalion finally did arrive at the line, but late.

The lirst thing referred to by Maj Bikchentayev and other officers in explaining what happened was the poor level of training of the driver-mechanics. And in general, it was difficult not to agree with this self-critical admission. Some driver-mechanics on the march had actually not, as they say, shown their best sides.

But nonetheless, the matter does not rest with the driver-mechanics alone. A detailed analysis of the causes of the tankers' failure, performed after the exercise by representatives of the okrug staff, showed that what happened had become possible in large measure due to the poor preparation of the officers themselves. This was manifested in different ways in their actions depending on their duties. For example, A. Bazyaka, the battalion technical unit deputy commander, did not devote the requisite special attention in his march preparation to checking the good condition of the running gear and control mechanisms of the vehicles. All the vehicles were not equipped in advance with special gear to avert rolling when stopping on ascents and descents. The technical unit deputy commander also did not concern himself with carrying out necessary adjustments on the equipment taking into account the relief of the terrain on which the battalion had to operate.

The battalion staff headed by Maj A. Simonov also permitted a blunder. Calculating from a map the route of travel, speed and time, they did not pay attention to many distinguishing features of the mountainous terrain, including the complexity of the relief, the steepness of the incline etc. As a result, the actual length of the march route turned out to be significantly greater than that calculated.

Another instance is called to mind that, it seems to me, is worthy of attention. Analysis demonstrates that both the lack of coordination in the battalion technical support on the march and some inaccuracies in the calculations could have been compensated for to a certain degree, let's say, by means of manipulating the speed of travel on individual sections. It is well known, for example, that passes, ravines, mountain gaps, canyons and tunnels should be traversed by subunits at the maximum possible speed. This has been confirmed repeatedly in practice. In the battalion, this rule was not followed. And not, it became clear, because of a disregard for experience. Some officers simply turned out to be insufficiently prepared to lead columns at high speeds and to control march formations in travel over terrain with a complex relief. They also had difficulties in getting oriented in the mountains.

Thus, it is not difficult to be persuaded that the battalion's failure on the march was caused by a whole set of various types of causes, that testify to serious omissions in the march preparation of the personnel and, first and foremost, the officers.

It could appear to some that a battalion is not a large enough scale for generalization. It should be noted in this regard that the like has, unfortunately, been observed in the concluding stage of the training year in a number of other subunits. Thus, the shortcomings noted here are in large part typical in march training. Naturally, everything will depend in the future on how quickly we eliminate them.

In particular, much can be done over the course of preparation for the new training year, if the requisite attention is devoted to questions of march training during assemblies of various grades of the officer corps and to both theoretical and practical exercises in the system of command preparation. Experience demonstrates that success in this endeavor is achieved where questions of march training are worked out a part of a whole with tactical, firing and other forms of combat preparation and where not only solid skills for controlling subunits in complex conditions are developed among the officers, but where they are taught to solve fully all problems associated with ensuring the movement of troops on their own. This is especially important when the subject is mountain marches.

It is totally inadmissible to attempt to solve all of these questions under simplified conditions. As acknowledged by, for example, Maj Bikchentayev, he had never before had to lead combined columns in the mountains. There had been no special exercises in the command preparation system of the regiment at which this question could have been worked out. Isn't this an indication of a simplified approach to the matter?

Of course, certain skills of column control can be acquired on level terrain. But mountains are mountains. They present their own special demands for the preparation of both people and equipment. They should proceed from that when planning march preparation in the upcoming training year. It would be simply irrational to waste the time and resources allotted for its improvement without utilizing the terrain factor.

Of course, there exists positive experience on this plane among the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District. The "Caucasus-85" exercises in particular, as well as exercises conducted in the subunits and units in the concluding stage of the training year, demonstrated that many commanders and staffs have full command of the art of conducting troops in the mountains.

We will refer to as an example the motorized rifle battalion under the command of Maj V. Ovcharik and the artillery division commanded by Maj V. Kiminchizha. In the course of the exercises these subunits, along with the tank battalion under the command of Maj Bikchentayev discussed above, also had to execute a march on an Alpine route. Moreover, it was in the dark. Anyone who has had to operate in the mountains at night knows how much darkness complicates the fulfillment of any task. The motorized riflemen and the artillerymen none-theless operated with precision and harmony. The speed of the march was high, but not one vehicle broke down by the fault of the driver complement or lagged behind. Upon arriving at the designated area, the subunits had demonstrated great combat coordination in solving problems arising in the course of the exercise.

In becoming familiar with the experience of these subunits, one can see distinctly that success did not come to the motorized riflemen and artillerymen on its own. Behind it was the intensive labor of the commanders and political workers and laborious organizational and educational work. Every field movement, tactical-firing drill and exercise is utilized with the aim of improving the march training of the personnel. Great attention is devoted in this to training soldiers to drive vehicles at high speeds, to combat and pre-combat formations and to operations with unexpected changes in the direction of travel, deployment and entry into battle on the move.

It is also favorable that in a number of subunits they have begun to devote greater attention to working out questions relating to march support. Mine clearers, other detachable and built-in equipment, underwater driving kits, bridgelayers, track bridges and small-scale mechanical equipment in particular are utilized more actively in exercises.

The following detail is also typical of leading subunits and units. Here, questions of march preparation are worked out taking into account local natural and climatic conditions and, as a rule, against a complex tactical background. It is fully consistent that the personnel of the subunits and units we are concerned with are distinguished not only by a knowledge of how to use the equipment most effectively, but also by the ability to bear great physical and psychological burdens in a stable manner.

However, even where questions of march preparation are resolved, shall we say,

somewhat better, there are still unutilized reserves. Specifically, the contribution of political workers and party and Komsomol organizations to the matter could be weightier. They should more actively and decisively battle those who underestimate the significance of march preparation and who allow simplifications and indulgences in this matter. Naturally, an active quest for new ways of intensifying the training process overall is also needed. On the march, as is well known, a struggle is always going on to win time and seize initiatives. It must be said that the inculation of commanders and all personnel with a high sense of responsibility for the efficient use of time in everyday life in the best possible way will make possible the solution of this problem.

The district headquarters and the management of combat preparation try not to lose sight of all that is of value that has been accumulated by the troops in the organization of march preparation. For example, on the basis of a deep study of their experience, leading commanders this year developed recommendations on organizing march preparation in mountainous conditions that will undoubtedly be of use in the future. Taking into account climatic features and the relief of the Transcaucasus terrain, special exercises were devised on questions connected with driving combined columns in the mountains. The training aids and equipment were also improved in accordance with this.

Practice suggests the expediency of specific corrections in the training plans, especially in the section touching on the technical preparation of the officers and the driving complement. More attention must be devoted in particular to questions associated with the preparation of vehicles for mountain marches, the inculation of psychological stability into the soldiers and producing in them the ability to overcome altitude sickness, oxygen insufficiency etc.

Combat preparation does not stand still. A persistent quest for more effective modes and methods of training and educating the personnel continues. And one of the most important areas of this work is the improvement of the march training of the troops.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ON SDI, NEW U.S. JOINT SPACE COMMAND

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank Ye. Nikitin: "Up the Steps of Madness"]

[Text] "Nuclear megadeath is nothing to the reactionery circles that dream in thousands of warheads, they are increasing their monstrous arsenal on Earth and threatening outer space, contemplating 'star wars,'" writes G. M. Grechko, a two-time Hero of the Soviet Union and a pilot and cosmonaut of the USSR, in an article that appeared in the recently published special edition of the magazine NOVOYE VREMYA. This edition was formulated as a supplement to the magazine titled "The Arms Race: Do not Permit it in Space and End it on Earth."

With extensive factual material, the authors show how the plans to militarize space were conceived and spread, how the increase of the Pentagon's nuclear potential in combination with the notorious "star wars" program threatens peace and convincingly exposes the adventurism of the current U.S. leaders, who have begun to dream of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union by creating space weapons.

American imperialism is climbing the steps of madness toward the beginning of a principally new round of the arms race. Practically all systems of space weapons are presently at various stages of development and testing, including chemical lasers, elementary particle accelerators, X-ray lasers with a nuclear surge, electromagnetic cannons, satellites with small self-guided missiles...

The authors emphasize that an especial danger of the adventurist policy of the United States is that the arms race can develop into a qualitatively new phase--uncontrollable processes will begin in the area of armaments and the risk of nuclear war arising will increase sharply. Common sense suggests that the only way out of the situation that has been created is to freeze the nuclear arsenals of all sides, halt the preparations for creating new attack weapons for space placement and on that basis immediately go over to a decrease in the accumulated stockpiles of arms.

The practical affairs of Washington demonstrate that across the ocean they do not wish to heed the voice of reason. The recent militarist actions of the White House are a particular challenge. The United States conducted testing of the ASAT anti-satellite system against a real target in space. There

then followed testing of a land-based laser installation during which a laser beam was directed against a Terrier-Malamute missile and tracked it in flight. The conducting of underground nuclear weapons testing continues.

To coordinate efforts in militarizing space, on September 23 the United States began to operate the Joint Space Command of the U.S. Armed Forces with staff headquarters in Colorado Springs (the state of Colorado). As shown by the authors of the special supplement to NOVOYE VREMYA magazine, the initial program of operation of the Joint Space Command has already been formulated and intermediate targets and timetables have been projected.

Also revealing are the resources assigned to basic research and development in the 1984-87 fiscal years. Appropriations for the main types of activity within the "star wars" framework over this period will increase a hundredfold: from 50 million dollars in 1984 to 4.9082 billion in 1987.

The accumulation of ever newer and more destructive types of weapons both on Earth and in space only heightens international tension. As noted by M. S. Gorbachev at a meeting with French parliamentarians, the world situation is so tense "that it has now become extremely difficult to negotiate not only on the complicated issues that cannot be put aside, but on relatively simple problems. If we do not stop the current operative tendencies, we may not be able to overcome their monstrous inertia. Discussion will become more difficult."

The value of the supplement to NOVOYE VREMYA magazine is that light is thrown upon the most pressing problem of modern times from different angles. The material has a rich style, is filled with illustrations and is set forth in popular style.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

JAPAN SAID TO PRODUCE SAM MISSILES FOR U.S. TEST RANGE

LD281211 Moscow TASS in English 0944 GMT 28 Nov 85

[Text] Tokyo, 28 Nov (TASS)--TASS correspondent Aleksandr Anichkin reports: Green-colored crates are being hurriedly packed at secret laboratories of the Japan Defense Agency these days to be dispatched overseas.

Their designation is a special Pentagon testing range for air defense systems. The shipments will open a new page in Japanese-American military cooperation as they will include for the first time a new surface-to-air (SAM) missile developed by the Japanese Defense Agency.

The newspaper daily YOMIURI said the Pentagon hoped that the missile system's transfer would open for it access to Japanese high technology.

The Nakasone government announced a decision to provide the American ally with all the military hardware it needed, as far back as 1983, but so has refrained, under pressure from opposition parties for compliance with the official ban on arms exports, from taking any practical steps in this direction.

But the pressure of the U.S. and Japanese military lobbies has now opened for Japanese armaments the door to the United States. An appropriate agreement will soon be signed by representatives of the Pentagon and its Japanese counterpart. But even though the military deal is not yet finalized, expert delegations from across the ocean have started paying frequent visits to Japan and making one request after another for deadly weapons. Many of the requested systems are needed by Washington for its "Star Wars" program.

Acting in curcumvention of the government, many Japanese concerns are already busy supplying part of these products to the United States since the so-called dual technology, which can be used for both military ends and civilian purposes is not covered by the official ban. Closely involved in the production of Tomahawk cruise missiles, for example, is the Kyocera (Kuoto ceramics) company which has captured 70 percent of the American market of electronic ceramic devices for the aerospace and munitions industry.

The involvement of Far Eastern concerns in U.S. military buildup programs, the daily YOMIURI warned, was leading directly to the emergency of a powerful military-industrial complex in Japan.

19274

CSO: 1812/51

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

CRITIQUE OF DANISH ROLE IN NATO

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Col A. Sergeyev: "In NATO Harness: The Leadership of the North Atlantic Bloc Turns Denmark into a Beachhead of Aggression"]

[Text] Combat aircraft with the markings of the air forces of the United States, West Germany, Great Britain and other NATO countries are again thundering over the cities and towns of the Danish Kingdom and naval military forces of the bloc states are plying the coastal waters of the country. The latest dress rehearsal for aggressive warfare is being conducted in Western Europe and the Atlantic—the "Autumn Forge-85" series of NATO joint armed forces exercises. The NATO strategists, to the accompaniment of the pretty universally soured myth of the "Soviet military threat," are working out plans to wage war on land, sea and air and are using for this, specifically, the territorial waters and airspace of Denmark.

This is not the first instance of allowing the use of the country's territory and the participation of Denmark in such an imposing "muscle flexing" of the North Atlantic union by the Danish ruling circles. One need only be reminded of last year's "Bold Gannet" exercise, in which approximately 25,000 soldiers and officers, more than 200 combat aircraft and 100 basic-class ships took part. At it, questions of increasing the NATO Joint Armed Forces groups to wage combat operations not only in the area of the straits, but to deliver strikes beyond its boundaries, were worked out as one of the main tasks. Where the arrows on the maps are aimed for such strikes, emanating from the new NATO strategic plan--the Rogers Plan--it is not difficult to guess.

Along with conducting exercises and maneuvers, maesures are being speeded up to improve the operational preparation of Danish territory and to create favorable conditions for the accelerated movement of American and British ground troops, aircraft and marines in the event a "crisis situation" arises, which in NATO language signifies the period of immediate preparation for unleashing war. Principal airbases are being reconstructed, warehouses for aircraft armaments, fuel and lubrication materials and spare parts for U.S. Air Force "reinforcement troops" are being built and discussions are taking place with the United States and Great Britain on the timely warehousing of heavy weapons and military equipment in Denmark. Quite recently, the American battleship

Iowa, armed with Tomahawk nuclear cruise missiles, visited the Danish ports of Copenhagen and Arhus.

Just what aims are being pursued by conducting this group of measures? As is well known, at one time the Danish government made certain unilateral pledges, in accordance with which Denmark refused the placing of nuclear weapons and foreign troops on its territory in time of peace. This "basing and nuclear policy" that they love to talk about in Copenhagen, however, has begun to unravel under the pressure of the NATO "hawks" who are trying to turn Denmark into a beachhead of aggression against the socialist countries.

Danish representatives take part in the development of the bloc's nuclear strategy, and the Danish defense minister attends the NATO nuclear planning group sessions. What is more, the Danish leaders reserve for themselves the right to allow the placing of nuclear weapons on the country's territory under "crisis situation" conditions; that is, at a still-peaceful time. It is fully understandable that the bloc leadership will be able to create such a situation when it needs to unleash aggression.

The Danish governing circles, to please the Pentagon and NATO staff headquarters, are doing everything possible and even impossible so as to ruin the practical realization of the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. Typical in this regard is the recent interview of Danish Prime Minister P. Schlüter with the Danish newspaper JYLLANDS-POSTEN. Emphasizing that the participation of Danes in a nuclear-free zone does not conform to their membership in the North Atlantic bloc, he declared that "we can discuss and analyze the possibilities for establishing a nuclear-free zone in Europe until we reach full understanding on the part of the NATO partners. It is quite obvious, however, that we cannot do this by turning our backs on our partners." How can questions of national security be decided if reactionary forces have even succeeded in dragging into the fundamental law of the country (Article 20 of the Danish Constitution) a proposition on the possibility of limiting national sovereignty on behalf of "international powers," by which is implied the ruling organs of NATO created in time of peace!

As concerns the presence of foreign troops on Danish territory, according to the official declaration of Defense Minister H. Engell servicemen of the other NATO countries spent 300,000 man-days in Denmark in 1983. In 1984 the quantity grew by 20 percent and totalled 360,000 man-days. Such a trend, apparently, will continue in the future. Moreover, the locations of foreign troops on Danish territory are drawing ever closer to the borders of the countries of socialist cooperation.

A special place in the plans of the Pentagon strategists is reserved for the Danish island of Bornholm, which occupies an important strategic location in the Baltic. They want to turn it into a beachhead for delivering strikes against territory and facilities of the Warsaw Pact countries. Judging by all of this, the current Danish government has taken an official course of retreat from the practice that developed after the Second World War of refraining from allowing foreign troops onto the island and is preparaing Danish society for

the further militarization of the island in the interests of the bloc. In June of this year alone, a submarine, a tender and a guided-missile patrol boat detachment of the West German Navy called at the Port of Bornholm. The military aircraft of the NATO countries are also continuing their familiarization with the island.

The "basing policy" is also contradicted by the fact that part of the Danish territory of Greenland is given over to American military bases. The airbase constructed here at Thule and a number of military facilities are used in the interests of American strategic nuclear forces.

All of this suggests an idea of the special role that they would like to assign to Denmark in the NATO team. According to the plans of the NATO strategists, it is becoming not only the "guardian" of the Baltic straits but ever more a beachhead of aggression against the countries of socialist cooperation. It is established that the activity and scale of the military preparations of NATO in the area of the straits of the Baltic Sea, and in Denmark in particular, have grown seriously.

All of these actions are accompanied by antisoviet hysteria and play into the hands of those forces in favor of undermining the good-neighbor relations of Denmark with the socialist countries. History has repeatedly confirmed, however, the fallaciousness of such a course. This is well understood by Danish progressive circles. Ordinary Danes are realizing ever more the danger of the military preparations and are raising a voice of protest.

The interests of peoples and the cause of peace and security are met not by confrontation, but only by a course of developing mutually beneficial cooperation and good-neighbor relations both in Northern Europe and on the European continent as a whole.

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AFGHANISTAN

TASS ANALYST NOTES CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN REBELS

LD022105 Moscow TASS in English 2022 GMT 2 Dec 85

["Washington's Words and Deeds"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow December 2 TASS--TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

The Western mass media, above all the U.S. ones, have of late been asserting that there is a change in Washington's approach to some of them, the U.S. administration is all but prepared to promote the settlement of that situation.

This gives rise to questions. Can it be that the U.S. administration has awakened to common sense and decided to stop armed interference in the affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan? Maybe they in Washington decided to give up financing and training of counterrevolutionaries and sending their bands armed to the teeth into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to stage brigandage and terror on Afghan land? Maybe they in Washington decided to contribute to the efforts taken for the purpose of normalizing the situation in that region?

Nothing of the kind. As the TIME magazine reports, the U.S. Congress allocated by a secret decision \$470 million to the United States Central Intelligence Agency for the current financial year for the increase of supplies to the gangs of Afghan counterrevolutionaries. This is far from the first handout to those who have been used by the United States for many years in succession to wage an undeclared war against the sovereign non-aligned state, which is a United Nations member, just as the USA. Moreover, the financing of counter-revolutionary gangs assumes ever wider scopes which is shown, especially, by the latest contributions.

According to TIME, the U.S. secret operations are implemented through agents and front companies which purchase armaments in some countries and later deliver them to Pakistan, usually through the port of Karachi. In Karachi, the consignments of arms are placed at the disposal of the special department of the Pakistani Armed Forces and are carried by army trucks toward the Afghan border, into the area of Peshawar, or the northern part of Baluchistan.

It should be noted that the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST has once described the secret aid given by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to Afghan

counterrevolutionaries as the biggest U.S. secret operation since the Vietnam war. The same opinion is expressed by the TIME magazine. It writes that the conflict in Afghanistan is the biggest undeclared war now waged by the United States. And, going by the largesse of the Congress, the United States is not going to stop that war. Quite the other way, it intends to spread the war contrary to Washington's assurances about the striving toward the resolution of "regional conflicts."

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CSO: 1812/43

AFGHANISTAN

7TH ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET-AFGHAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY NOTED

LD050235 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 4 Dec 85

[Report by correspondent Boris Savodyan from Kabul]

[Text] The 7th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, good neighborliness, and cooperation between the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan falls on 5 December.

Our correspondent, Boris Savodyna, reports from Kabul:

The sides declared their determination in that document to strengthen the two countries' friendship and to develop mutually beneficial economic and scientific-technical links upon a basis of equality and mutual advantage. Over 100 Soviet-Afghan cooperation projects are functioning in Afghanistan. They produce approximately 60 percent of that country's total industrial output. A similar number of projects are in the stage of development or construction with our country's assistance. Also of exceptional importance is the fact that the process of the formation of a national working class has accelerated in Afghanistan in the course of Soviet-Afghan cooperation. Soviet specialists have helped 75,000 afghans acquire a working vocation. The training of qualified workers is also being carried out at nine vocational and technical colleges in Afghanistan which have been set up with the USSR's assistance.

Soviet assistance is helping the Afghan people eliminate the consequences of the damage being inflicted by the armed counterrevolutionaries. The dushmans are attempting to disrupt the regular movement of road transport, having launched a real mine war on the DRA's roads. The Soviet Union's assistance is invaluable in these conditions. It has been supplying Afghanistan with a large quantity of foodstuffs, clothing, footwear, and other goods. Characterizing the essence of the traditional Afghan-Soviet links, Comrade Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the DRA's National People's Party Central Committee and Revolutionary Council chairman, said in one of his speeches: We know that the Soviet Union is sincerely striving to see that Afghanistan remains independent, free, and flourishing. Our people are happy that the frontier between our countries has always been one of friendship and brotherhood, which does not divide, but, indeed, brings the Soviet and Afghan peoples closer together.

/12624

AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW ON PAKISTANI POSITION IN UN AFGHAN TALKS

LD160024 Moscow World Service in English 1531 GMT 15 Nov 85

[Commentary by Aleksandr Korolev]

[Text] The United States and its allies have been able to impose a resolution on the United Nations General Assembly on the so-called Afghan problem, which actually means interfering in the affairs of sovereign Afghanistan. Speaking in the debate the delegate of Afghanistan, Mohammad Farid Zarif, demanded an immediate end to the undeclared war being conducted against the people in his country by the imperialists and reactionaries. Here is what a Radio Moscow observer Aleksandr Korolev writes in this connection.

The speeches made by representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan at the session of the UN General Assembly have again drawn attention to the Afghan problem. The positions of the two countries were again made clear. The representative of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zarif, called on Pakistan to enter into direct talks. Pakistan's foreign minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, however categorically rejected the proposal, saying that Afghan-Pakistani talks are already going on in Geneva with the mediation of a representative of the UN secretary general. Later, however, Yaqub Khan actually contradicted himself when he said that five rounds of those talks have failed to produce any tangible results to help solve the problem of Afghanistan.

Pakistan's present stand on the problem of Afghanistan looks especially ground-less and even contradictory when you recall what President Ziaul Haq said several days ago. On returning from a trip to Egypt he said at a news conference that the Afghan problem is extremely complicated and cannot be solved by military means. Therefore, he said, it's necessary to seek a political solution. Such statements could of course be only welcomed if they were backed with practical steps and means. But it is in line with Islamabad's inconsistent policy that after making such encouraging declarations the military authorities again refused to take such a natural step as to enter into talks with the government of a neighboring Muslim country, and if they do not do that it's apparently because something or someone is holding them back.

In that connection the weekly VIEWPOINT justly complained that the military authorities of Pakistan are bound hand and foot and cannot make any independent moves towards Afghanistan even if they wanted to, without first receiving the

blessing of Washington. And such a conclusion, which is not very pleasant to the patriotic-minded Pakistanis, is based on a sober study of the events of recent years and how they are connected. It's noteworthy that since the United States allocated the military regime of Pakistan \$3.2 billion in military and economic aid the regime has not come out with a single peace initiative as regards the Afghan problem. And another example, as American military assistance grew Pakistan began taking an ever greater part in the undeclared war against Afghanistan, which the American press openly describes as the biggest CIA covert operation.

With the knowledge and assistance of the military authorities the number of military bases of the anti-Afghan hirelings in Pakistan increased to 120. Besides, Pakistani military units are already taking a direct part in terrorist operations in the neighboring Muslim country. Islamabad's participation in the covert operation of the CIA has reached a point when General Ziaul Haq openly says that the war is also Pakistan's war. And so the military regime of Pakistan is following obediently in the wake of the aggressive course of Washington, this is expressed directly in Afghanistan, where bands of mercenaries are sent in from Pakistani bases. This is also expressed at the UN General Assembly, where a representative of Pakistan has again rejected the peaceful initiative of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

This, no doubt, will be welcomed by the U.S. administration which, as THE WASHINGTON POST wrote, intends to fight in Afghanistan to the last Afghan. But what will such obedience bring the Pakistani people? Many Pakistanis are thinking about this and arriving at very sad conclusions. The newspaper JANG wrote that the future generations will have the most pitiful opinion of the wisdom of the present generation if for a few American F-16 aircraft and a certain sum of money it finds itself in a trap of events the further development of which it will no longer be able to influence.

/12766 CSO: 1812/43

AFGHANI STAN

GUERRILLAS 'PARTICULARLY ACTIVE' IN KONAR PROVINCE

LD291736 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 29 Nov 85

[Text] By a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Lieutenant Nikolay Kuznetsov has been posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for courage and heroism displayed during the fulfillment of his international duty in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

This occurred in Kunar Province on the border with Pakistan, reports a TASS correspondent. The dushmans are particularly active here. They are trying to destroy an irrigation system and to ruin the sowing or harvesting in one of the country's major grain areas, so that hunger comes to the villages.

On this occasion the rebels carried out a number of sorties as they attacked a freight column. Reinforcements and arms had to be moved to the band's location. In order to carry out this task, a company which included Platoon Commander Kuznetsov was singled out to assist an Afghan Army unit. His detachment was detailed for reconnaissance work.

The scouts were unable to find the band in the nearby village, so they set off again along the mountain paths. In another village the scouts came up against an ambush. The men had hardly reached the central area before they were hit by machine gun fire. Kuznetsov's platoon found itself cut off from the main forces of the company. Lt Kuznetsov ordered his subordinates to break through to their own ranks while he, with three men, remained to cover their departure. These daredevils moved from house to house, covering their comrades. Kuznetsov's group was detained at the end house. The officer noticed that the men from his platoon had managed to join up with their own forces. Just then an enemy bullet hit him in the leg. And when the dushmans again took up the attack, Kuznetsov, realizing that as he was wounded he would not be able to reach his own men, engaged his final battle.

His comrades could hear fierce firing. The lieutenant's rifle struck the enemy. Then the firing died away. The cartridges were spent. Then Kuznetsov grabbed a grenade. And when the dushmans threw themselves upon the officer, hoping to capture him alive, there was an explosion. With his last grenade the hero blew up himself and his enemies. The bandits paid dearly for the death of the lieutenant. The Soviet servicemen who arrived on the scene flushed them out of the village, having completely wiped out the band.

The hero was buried in his home territory, in Tambovshchina.

AFGHAN1STAN

MOSCOW PAPER REPORTS DRA ARMED FORCES CONFERENCE

PM261227 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Nov 85 Second Edition p 3

[Our correspondent Major A. Oliynik report: "Conference in Kabul"]

[Text] Kabul, 25 Nov--A conference of leading personnel of the Armed Forces and the party and state aktiv of the DRA has taken place here to examine ways of further increasing the combat capability of the Afghan Army.

The conference was opened by B. Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and chairman of the DRA Revolutionary Council. In his speech he dwelt on the current tasks of the People's Army, arising from the declaration recently approved at an extraordinary session of the DRA Revolutionary Council "On the national-democratic nature of the April revolution and its urgent tasks in present-day conditions" and the decisions of the 16th PDPA Central Committee Plenum, which form the basis of all the political, economic, and organizational activity of the country's state organs and public organizations.

A report on the tasks of replenishing the troops and improving drafting into the Army was delivered by S.A. Keshtmand, chairman of the DRA Council of Ministers. The military question, the speaker stressed, remains the main question at present. All political, organizational, economic, and military activity must be aimed at completely routing the armed counterrevolution, which is encouraged and directed by international imperialism headed by the United States. The resolute routing of rebel gangs requires above all an improvement in the Army's combat capability, level of equipment, and morale. The resolution of this important task should be the subject of priority attention from all party and state organs both centrally and locally.

The conference was addressed by Lieutenant General N. Muhammad, DRA minister of defense; Lieutenant General (M.Ya. Sadeki), chief of the DRA Army Main Political Directorate; and other senior officials.

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AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW TV SHOWS REBEL ACTION AGAINST FREIGHT COLUMN

LD292332 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 29 Nov &5

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by station correspondent Mikhail Leshchinskiy in Afghanistan entitled: "Road Through Salang"]

[Excerpt] Winter is coming to Afghanistan and although as yet the snow lies just here on the Salang pass, at a height of more than 4,000 meters, it will soon be in Kabul too and in other towns and villages in the country. [video shows snow-covered peaks, cutting to lower ground below the snow line where the correspondent stands, speaking into microphone; barren empty landscape all around, mountain tops of other side of the valley in the background, shrouded in cloud; caption: operator, V. Gusev; video shows close-up of a road, visible as a thin line initially behind the correspondent; initial long-shot of road shows over 12 vehicles, some lorries, negotiating an S-bend in the road]

It must be said that for people of Afghanistan the winter is a time of severe ordeals and first and foremost it is a problem of heating, preparation of food—you see, I recall that a kilogram of firewood here still costs as much as a kilogram of bread. And therefore the country's main artery, this road here, linking Kabul with the port of Hayratan, doesn't become silent even for an hour. And traveling along it in the first place is fuel, petrol carriers. Pipelines which have stretched out along the road are at work. [camera cuts to show close-up of section of road at bottom of the pass, high snow-covered ground immediately in background; an unidentified armored vehicle is followed by two lorries, another lorry shown close-up following behind; next close-up shot shows misty road conditions and a line of seven petrol carriers traveling nose to tail; road surface is narrow strip of tarmac cover, sufficient for two lines of traffic, rough terrain immediately alongside]

Drivers are hurrying for they all realize that soon the passes will close and conditions for transportation will worsen. [video shows glimpse of Afghan-looking man in uniform, behind him a section of what could be a pipeline; camera cuts quickly to show moving petrol carrier and a lorry being overtaken by it; large stationary vehicle in the background]

But it must be said that the enemies of the revolution realize this too. It is precisely at this time that sabotage actions on the roads have intensified. [video shows brief view of snow-topped terrain, followed by shot of road with

more vehicles passing, one marked "danger, inflammable"; at side of road is a view of the back of a tank, man standing on top]

This took place on one of the sections of the Kabul-Hayratan route. [video of mountain top, smoke cloud from where shots are coming; road scene shows two uniformed crouched soldiers, one firing a rifle, the other a rocket; camera cuts to show two more soldiers firing rifles from the top of a large tank; overturned burnt-out vehicle seen partially next to the tank; close-up of grain smoldering on the ground, followed by view of listing petrol carrier alongside partially covered with flames]

A dushman band fell upon a column of peaceful freight. [words indistinct due to heavy exchange of firing] As you can see, bread is on fire, and tanks [tsisterny] with fuel are on fire. And battle is underway. [words indistinct] fighting (?all around) Our soldiers, who were called out here, are engaged in it. A pipeline carrying fuel was also damaged. It is also being quickly restored by the soldiers. Traffic has already been opened up along the road. [video shows further views of same battle, showing tank gun tip followed by shot of mountain, smoke rising from area hit; close-up of Soviet soldier handling gun, brief shot of listing petrol carrier off the side of the road, another soldier firing rifle near a damaged overturned vehicle; three soldiers shown standing firing rifles, then shot of five uniformed men in rest position, one of which is same Afghan-looking soldier as in earlier shots]

The remainder of the band were taken prisoner and now a severe sentence by the pecple awaits these hired killers. [video shows more shots of battle scene, two lorries passing through damaged section of road with crater visible at the side of the road; brief view of section of pipe being moved by soldiers, flames licking section at the side of the road, soldiers repairing pipeline; another view of petrol vehicles passing, including one marked "danger, inflammable"; final shot shows five Afghans in civilian garments walking with hands behind their backs, around them Afghans, not uniformed, holding rifles and conducting them along the road; view alongside of badly damaged overturned lorry].

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AFGHANISTAN

BAKU COMMENTARY VIEWS DRA ELECTIONS

GF201256 Baku International Service in Azeri 1300 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Unattributed commentary: "Elections in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Dear listeners, elections are being held in the DRA for the local sovereignty organs. The people are to elect their representatives to the sovereignty organs at the town and district levels. Until April 1978, that is, until the April Revolution, local leaders were not elected. They were just appointed. The feudal lords and their subordinates ruled individually. However, the representatives of the people were elected as governors and as village headmen after the revolution. The democratic principles are now being broadened. Everything is going to be resolved with the participation of the people's representatives who will be elected.

Elections have been completed in Kabul and the capital's province and in Badakhshan and Nimruz Provinces. Elections will soon be over in Balkh Province and are about to start in Nangarhar Province. Elections in Afghanistan are being held in stages. The reason for this is the consideration given to the different lifestyle of nomadic tribes living in the high mountains and on the plains. In addition, there are the difficulties created by the enemies of the revolution. The bands of armed bandits, armed with CIA funds and sent into Afghanistan, are terrorizing the people in a number of places.

The bandits endeavored to disrupt elections in a number of districts in the mountainous Badakhshan Province. However, their effort was unsuccessful. The people actively take part in elections in every corner of Afghanistan. This is the first time in Afghanistan's history that simple people are to elect those they see as worthy to exercise administrative powers. They will elect the most esteemed and influencial people. Among the elected will be peasants, workers, civil service employees, traders, and religious officials.

The workers expressed support for revolutionary changes during the pre-election meetings and gathering. The objectives and the tasks of these changes have been established in the program of the DRA Revolutionary Council. Representatives of the various stratums of the community in Afghanistan have participated in the debate of this program, together with the leaders of the country, prior to its adoption. Muhammad Nazim, a worker in the [name indistinct] vehicle

transportation establishment, was among them. In a statement to a Soviet radio correspondent, he stated that the objective of the program is to bring happiness to the people of Afghanistan and turn Afghanistan into a strong and sovereign country. The unity of all people living in Afghanistan is essential to achieve these lofty objectives. All the honorable people of Afghanistan, including those who have been misled through deceit and the use of force, have to work together to realize the wishes of the people and to leave poverty, illiteracy, and [word indistinct] behind.

Muhammad Nazim said: Unity is the main factor that will facilitate our success.

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CSO: 1831/407

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

FIGHTING IN THREE AREAS--Kabul, 1 Dec (TASS)--Units of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's Armed Forces are continuing their successful operations in liquidating bandit groups penetrating the country from abroad. The BAKHTAR agency reports that a gang of 109 dushmans has been wiped out in Kunduz province. Gangs of counterrevolutionaries have also been wiped out in the districts of Bagrami and Chahar Aslab in Kabul Province. During the operations ground-to-ground missiles, mortars, grenade launchers, and foreign-made ammunition and subversive literature were seized. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0748 GMT 1 Dec 85 LD]/12766

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27 January 1986